![]() ![]() Critically, they did not have most of their cavalry scouting units, and then did not effectively utilize the ones they had, so many times they did not know what was in front of them or how strong these forces were. Nevertheless, the initial mobilization went faster than expected, and the Russians met their commitment date, although it meant that they did not have all of their forces in place. The author of this book quotes Bismark, who said that no nation “should sacrifice its existence on the altar of fidelity to a treaty.” Keeping this promise would have dire consequences. The Russians had promised France that they would take the initiative and cross into East Prussia fifteen days after mobilization, even though everyone knew that with their poor transportation system and primitive communications their armies would be only partially ready. It also explains the decisions of the commanders as they sought to exploit advantages and respond to enemy moves. This book does an excellent job explaining how the battles unfolded, and includes a number of color maps showing movements, mostly at the corps and division levels. The commander of the Second Army, Samsonov, committed suicide, and three of his corps commanders were taken prisoner. From 26 August to 13 September 1914, which covers the initial encounters prior to Tannenberg as well as the Battle of the Masurian Lakes a week after, the Russians lost 250,000 men killed, wounded, and taken prisoner, along with vast quantities of armaments and supplies that could not easily be replaced. It was a disaster for the Russians, and is often called the greatest double-envelopment since Hannibal crushed the Romans at Cannae in 216BC. There are valuable lessons to be learned from both the German and Russian strategies and how they were executed. The battle of Tannenberg is still taught at war colleges around the world, and for good reason. Sweetman's Tannenberg 1914 is worthy of a solid Three Stars. Tannenberg triggered a chain of setbacks that ultimately ended the Romanov regime. ![]() ![]() The foolhardiness of Russian planning and the ineptitude of operational execution were the greatest contributions to the campaign's failure. Foch and Moltke attributed the troop transfer to East Prussia as a crucial factor only after the war and for their own personal and political purposes.ĭespite a 2:1 manpower advantage in the theater of operations, the Russians were routed and suffered approximately 250,000 killed, wounded, missing and captured against German losses of 37,000. He points out correctly that the German offensive in France had already run out of steam for several reasons. Sweetman disputes the post-war contention the defeats at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes were redeemed by the impact of the withdrawal of two German corps and a cavalry division from the Marne front in France to reinforce East Prussia. All the ingredients of military folly came into play: overconfidence, bad leadership, poor intelligence, half-hearted reconnaissance, shoddy staff work, inadequate logistics and antiquated communications all combined to create a fiasco unworthy of the commonplace bravery of Russian infantrymen and junior officers. Under the best of circumstances the tsarist army would have been unprepared to confront Germany, but an East Prussian invasion within fifteen days of mobilization was an unmitigated disaster. The Russians embarked rashly on an invasion of East Prussia in accordance with their treaty obligations and joint staff talks with the French. John Sweetman's Tannenberg 1914 is a short overview of the campaign which initiated World War I in the east and constituted one of the greatest military defeats in Russian history. ![]()
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